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As I read on I discovered that the fellow made no 
use of mind, and assigned to it no causality for 
the order of the world, but adduced causes like 
air and ether and water and many other absurdi-
ties . . . That is why one person surrounds the 
earth with a vortex, and so keeps it in place by 
means of the heavens, and another props it up on 
a pedestal of air, as though it were a wide 
platter. 
Socrates, Phaedo 98B-99B 
The role of consciousness in history is a fundamen-
tal problem for contemporary Marxism, and this is 
largely attributable to Marx's ambiguous discussion of 
consciousness and its material concomitants. The per-
sistent tensions in Marx's work between consciousness 
and matter, idealism and materialism, have nuver been 
satisfactorily resolved, despite Marx's protestations 
of "consistent naturalism"1 and Althusser's attempted 
distinction between the early and late Marx.1" Once 
this is accepted," as Lichtheim observes, 
various pseudo problems fall by the wayside, e.g. 
the question of "what Marx really meant" . . . it 
can be shown that in meaning different things at 
different times (and contradicting himself in the 
process) he was nonetheless consistent in strug-
gling with a particular set of theoretical and 
practical problems.1 
The role of consciousness in history was such a 
persistent problem for Marx, and in addressing it he 
addressed a complex of related issues: knowledge and 
the ideology/science distinction, causality, ethics, 
method, verifiability and the historical relationship 
between class structure/consciousness/conflict. Later 
philosophers and historians working in the Marxian tra-
dition have extended contradictory elements in Marx's 
treatment of consciousness in history into two general 
views, which will here be called the linear and the 
circular. Historical and philosophical criticism will 
be brought to bear on the two views of consciousness as 
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they appear in the practice of Marxian historians and 
philosophers. 
Within Marx's writings, the "linear" view of con-
sciousness is frequently emphasized at the expense of 
the "circular," but neither position is adopted exclu-
sively. Within the "linear" view, Marx "does not ex-
plain practice from the idea, but explains the forma-
tion of ideas from material practice."* Consciousness 
is understood as a dependent variable, a purely con-
tingent epiphenomenal reflex of material life. Ideas, 
"those phantoms formed in the human brain," are, in 
this conception 
necessarily sublimates of their material life 
process which is empirically verifiable and bound 
to material premises. Morality, religion, meta-
physics, and all the rest of ideology and their 
corresponding forms of consciousness no longer 
retain their semblance of independence . . . life 
is not determined by consciousness, but con-
sciousness by life.* 
Passages such as this verge on metaphysical monism 
by assigning ontological primacy to an Absolute (in 
this case, the "material life process," i.e. matter), 
and then positing a relationship of linear, mechanical 
causality between matter and consciousness.' 
The basic problem with this linear, strictly 
materialist view of history is that it is empirically 
falsified. History furnishes us with numerous occa-
sions in which a class behaves in a manner directly 
contrary to its true material interests, because of 
certain ideas held by its members: the readiness of 
poor, non-slaveholding Southern whites to fight for the 
Confederacy during the Civil War is one example, and 
the willingness of the European working class to fight 
in World War I is another. More damaging still are 
those instances in which an idea, occurring in the mind 
of one individual, radically alters the course of 
history. In what way did Issac Newton's objective 
relations to the means of production determine his in-
tegration of mathematics and physics? And how would 
European history have developed had his ideas not been 
promulgated? When the thought of one individual can 
have such a decisive impact on the concrete practice of 
so many others, grave questiqns arise, not only for 
linear Marxist materialism, but for any political 
science which purports to schematize future historical 
developments. 
When Marx adopts a "cirular" view, material prac-
tice is conceived of as conditioning rather than deter-
mining consciousness, and the verb bedingen is gen-
erally used in preference to the stronger bestimmen. 
The circular view allows consciousness a greater degree 
of autonomy, from material life'than the linear. When 
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Marx asserts that "it is quite immaterial what con-
sciousness starts to do on its own,"7 he ascribes to 
consciousness a remarkable degree of latitude for inde-
pendent action. Marx does not articulate the circular 
view systematically, but much of his work presupposes a 
substantial degree of autonomy for consciousness.* To 
ascribe to consciousness any degree of autonomy from 
material practice necessitates the invention of novel 
conceptions of causality, whose unifying characteristic 
is ambiguity.' Consciousness and matter, in this view, 
have an in(ter)determinate relationship, except "in the 
last instance," when matter causally determines con-
sciousness. This point is repeatedly made by the later 
Engels writing against economic determinism.10 
Regardless of whether material practice determines 
or conditions social consciousness, Marx generally in-
sists that there is an authentic distinction between 
true and false consciousness, or science and 
ideology.11 Marx understood science as the theoretical 
reproduction of the real world, a theoretical activity 
which leads to truth, or practically adequate 
thought.12 Although Marx does not use the term 
ideology in a systematic fashion (Ideen, Anschauungen, 
Doktrinen are used interchangeably with Ideologie), 
ideology is always a pejorative term. Ideology may be 
thought of as necessarily false thought in defense of 
class interests, the "false consciousness of man alien-
ated from himself by the division of labor."11 Within 
Marx's conception of history, during the interval 
between the initial division of labor and the global 
proletarian revolution, there must exist a hierarchical 
class structure of antagonistic producers and 
exploiters.14 During periods of social stasis, domi-
nant ideas are coextensive with the ideology of the 
ruling class, 1 8 while during periods of social revolu-
tion (when material productive forces contradict the 
relations of production) rival classes, each with its 
own ideology, contend for supremacy.l* Class conflict 
retains an ideological dimension until after the 
revolution, when ideology will no longer exist, because 
alienation will no longer exist, because classes will 
no longer exist. Science will be realized. Man will 
be redeemed.17 
Marx expects his assertions about history and class 
consciousness to be persuasive because they are true, 
which is to say that his premises are scientific and 
his assertions are the product of the empirical 
.(inductive) method." This begs the question of how 
the validity of Marxian empiricism and its premises may 
be determined. Marx appears to pull a metaphysical 
rabbit out of his hat by asserting that the premises of 
his empiricism authenticate themselves empirically. 
The premises from which we begin are not arbi-
trary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from 
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which abstraction can only be made in the 
imagination. They are the real individuals, 
their activity and the material conditions under 
which they live . . . These premises can thus be 
verified in a purely empirical way.*' 
This obscure passage seems to mean that when an obser-
ver is confronted with Marx's premises ("real 
individuals") about concrete human practice and their 
verification, his organs of sense will indicate that 
they are literally, obviously true. One assumes that 
this demonstration will convince everyone except those 
unfortunates born without organs of sense and those 
whose consciousness has been distorted by the ideology 
of their class. This variety of philosophical desk-
pounding must strain the credulity of even the most 
sympathetic reader. 
Much of the inconsistency in Marx's conception of 
history stems from his use of metaphorical speech.*' 
Three metaphors are essential to Marx's conception of 
history: "society is an organism;" "society is a 
building;" "society is a conversation."*1 The 
metaphor "society is an organism" (which reflects the 
most naturalistic elements in Marx) runs throughout 
Marx's work, and many subsidiary metaphors are closely 
related (i.e. "reproduction" of social relations, 
social "metabolism", "life" of a society). This 
metaphor has won general acceptance among later philo-
sophers and historians working in the Marxian 
tradition. 
Marx's later interpreters have not achieved a sim-
ilar consensus with regard to Marx's other two 
metaphors. "Linear" Marxists emphasize that "society 
is a building" while "circular" Marxists stress that 
metaphorically "society is a conversation."1* "Society 
is a building" is advocated by linear Marxists, because 
this "structure," when divided into an "economic base" 
and an "ideological superstructure," forcefully articu-
lates the primacy of matter and the directly contingent 
status of consciousness.21 This metaphor was ela-
borated into a monistic, reductive, mechanical concep-
tion of history by Engels,** Plekhanov,** and the 
theoreticians associated with the Second 
International.*' The events of World War I, in which 
the working classes of each of the most advanced capi-
talist nations senselessly slaughtered each other to 
protect the interests of their respective ruling 
classes, brought many of the shortcomings of linear 
Marxism to light.27 The linear Marxist position is 
also logically inseparable from ethical fatalism, which 
undermines the voluntarism necessary to revolutionary 
practice. For these and other reasons,*' circular 
Marxists, employing the metaphor that "society is a 
conversation,11 became increasingly prominent, espe-
cially after the October Revolution. Circular Marxists 
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view society as an interdeterminative conversation 
between two contradictory yet interpenetrative ele-
ments, consciousness and matter.2* This "dialectical" 
conception of society is essentially Hegelian, and it 
allows consciousness a quasi-autonomous relationship 
with matter which reflects its idealist origins. Most 
closely associated with this circular, dialectical 
Marxism are Lukacs 1 0 and Oramsci.11 Adherents of the 
building and conversation metaphors interacted dialec-
tically until shortly after the death of Lenin, when 
all theoretical contradictions were practically su-
blated and orthodoxy synthesized. Dialectical, circu-
lar Marxism was "negated," and its chagrined spokesmen 
recanted their errors publicly after the counterrevolu-
tionary tendencies of their opinions were empirically 
verified.12 Stalin's unification of theory and prac-
tice determined rather than conditioned the short-
circuiting of interdeterminist Marxism in the U.S.S.R. 
for the subsequent generation.11 
Marxism's linear/circular, building/conversation 
bifurcation was elaborated outside the U.S.S.R. within 
the context of a capitalist class structure.14 Despite 
this circumstance, both linear and circular Marxists 
insist that practically adequate thought like their own 
is possible, while the false consciousness that is an 
inevitable concomitant of a society divided into 
classes is to be found not only in "bourgeois ideology" 
but also, insidiously, within the other, pseudo-
Marxism. The most formidable institutional bastions of 
linear Marxism were the U.S. and European communist 
parties, whose theoreticians unanimously affirmed the 
reductive, monocausal orthodoxy into which Soviet 
Marxism had ossified. After orthodoxy's death in 1953, 
linear Marxism came under increasingly heavy ethical, 
methodological, and epistemological criticism. Linear 
Marxism retreated under these attacks until Louis 
Althusser discovered that the real Marx had been a 
structuralist—a breakthrough which enabled him to 
define such objections out of existence.11 
Althusser endorses the defintion of "structuralism" 
as an "ideology according to which only the relations 
between the elements (i.e., their places) in the total-
ity are significant, and the occupants of those places 
are arbitrary."1' This latest and most sophisticated 
version of linear Marxism17 approaches the relation 
between consciousness and matter by surrounding it with 
the multitude of all other relations that obtain in 
history, where perhaps it will be lost in the crowd. 
At any rate, it is rarely heard from again: Althusser 
prefers to focus on the totality of all relations, the 
"structure of structures," rather than examine any one 
of them. Althusser asserts that history "is not a text 
in which a voice (the Logos) speaks, but the inaudible 
and illegible notation of the effect of a structure of 
structures."1' Given chat "the whole existence of the 
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structure consists of its effects."1' Arthusser would 
like to understand "the determination of the elements 
of a structure, and the structural relations between 
those elements, and all the effects of those relations, 
by the effectivity of that structure."*• The effects 
of the structure of structures are determined (you 
guessed it) by a "structural causality" in which "the 
complex totality of a structure in dominance is a 
structure of effects with present-absent causes."*1 
Causality might have remained forever mired in the ter-
minological quicksand of Althusser's structuralism had 
not Balibar (Althusser's theoretical associate) 
provided the structure with some content: " . . . the 
economy is determinant . . . ."** 
"Consciousness" does not merit extensive treatment, 
because Althusser believes that "the concept is conta-
minated by the pre-Marxist ideology of the young 
Marx."*' There are, instead, two kinds of "knowledge 
effects," the scientific and the ideological, which are 
distinguished by the "mechanisms" that cause them 
("structurally," one would suppose).** Althusserian 
structuralism's scientific knowledge effect has the 
unique advantage of verifying itself in an utterly 
unimpeachable way: history does not validate Theory, 
Theory validates history.*1 This theoretical immunity 
from criticism makes Theory the perfect vehicle for 
legitimizing and consolidating totalitarian political 
practice.*' Althusserian structuralism could and did 
serve to justify the ways of Stalin (and could equally 
well legitimize the reaction to Stalin supported by his 
successors; the names change but the structure does 
not) to man.*' Theory is atheodicy.*' 
Circular Marxism is an intrinsically antinomian 
Weltanschauung which lacks the monolithic unity of the 
linear conception. Yet the cicrular Marxists,** who 
elaborated Gramsci and Lukacs (after 1935, when Lukacs 
himself abondoned this position) do share a more or 
less unified set of theoretical concerns." Circular 
Marxism shows a preference for the early (Hegelian) 
Marx, 1 1 emphasizes that metaphorically, "society is a 
conversation,,,s2 is empirically verified in history," 
defines consciousness as an essential attribute of any 
concrete historical class,** and attributes to con-
sciousness a (quasi, limited, partial, relative, semi, 
incomplete) autonomy.8* The advantage of this concep-
tion is that it creates the possibility of a theory of 
ethics, and thus of politics." 
The fundamental difficulty of circular Marxism is 
the "causal" relationship bewteen consciousness and 
matter in history.*" Matter causes consciousness, con-
sciousness causes matter; each causes the other, each 
causes itself. This causal relationship should not be 
mistaken for a form of necessity; still less is it a 
form of contingency. It is neither contingent nor 
necessary; simultaneously, it " is both." The con-
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sciousness of any given class is determined by its ob-
jective relation to the means of production, but the 
consciousness of the individuals composing any given 
class is not; consciousness is determined in general, 
not in specific.*' This causality is not a form of 
determination at all. It is the comprehensive ambi-
guity of Marx's conception of consciousness in history, 
reified. 
NOTES 
'Except as noted, all references to Marx refer 
hereafter to Robert Tucker, ed., The Marx Engels Reader 
(New York, 1978, 2nd edition). The quote is from The 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 115. 
'Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster 
(New York, 1969), p. 47 and passim. 
'George Lichtheim, From Marx to Hegel (New York, 
1971), p. 81. Tliis approach seems more sober and judi-
cious than Agnes Heller's, for example: "Like every 
other thinker of importance, he too refused to sacri-
fice the search for truth in various directions and 
along various paths on the altar of coherence . . . the 
immortality, the living content of Marx's thought 
. . . is based precisely on this brilliant lack of 
coherence." The Theory of Need in Marx (New York, 
1976), p. 87-88." 
*Tucker, ed., The German Ideology, p. 164. 
'Ibid., p. 154-155. It is, incidentally, a matter 
for speculatiaon what the phrase "material premises" 
means. Out of what "material" would one construct 
premises? A materialist premise (if this is what is 
meant) would not be "empirically verifiable" because 
Marxian empiricism presupposes the Marxian materialism 
it would then presume to validate. 
'Lichtheim argues that Marx did not endorse a 
reductive monocausal materialism (From Marx to Hegel, 
p. 25), but Marx cannot be absolved entirely. There 
are many passages from Marx that can legitimately be 
read as stating that matter determines consciousness. 
The German Ideology can certainly be read this way: 
ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expres-
sion of the dominant material relationships, the domi-
nant material relationships grasped as ideals." 
(Tucker, p. 172.) The Introduction to the Preface to 
the Critique of Political Economy is similarly 
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reductive: "It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their being, but their social being that 
determines their consciousness." (Ibid., p. 4.) 
"Tucker, ed., The German Ideology, p. 159. 
'This is the case, for example, when Marx states 
that while revolutionary class consciousness will 
necessarily be found among the proletarians, it "may of 
course arise among other classes too, through the con-
templation of the situation of this class." (Ibid., p. 
193.) The idea that some knowledge can be obtained as 
a pure act of cognition apart from the objective class 
position of the knower is surely a departure from the 
determinist conception of class structure and class 
consciousness, but it does explain Marx himself, who 
never sold his labor power for a wage. 
'To acknowledge this difficulty and to subsequently 
ignore it will not do. G. A. Cohen, in Karl Marx's 
Theory of History: A Defence (Princeton, 1978), p. 46, 
dodges the issue in just this way. 
"Tucker, ed., p. 762, EngeIs-J. Bloch, September 
21, 1890: "Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame 
for the fact that younger people sometimes lay more 
stress on the economic side than is due it. We had to 
emphasize the main principle vis ä vis our adversaries, 
who denied it, and we had not always the time, the 
place or the opportunity to allow the other elements 
involved in the interaction to come into their rights." 
"Although occasionally Marx lapses into outright 
historicism and thus epistemological relativism. For 
example in Tucker, ed.. The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 
140: " . . . men, who produce their social relations 
in accordance with their material productivity, also 
produce ideas, categories, that is to say the abstract, 
ideal expression of these same social relations. Thus 
the categories are no more eternal than the relations 
they express. They are historical and transitory 
products." Can one consistently argue this for the 
ideas and categories of number, cause, time, space, 
matter? It is understandable that Marxian historicism, 
and its implicit epistemological nihilism would make 
Althusser very upset, but it must be noted that his 
text disrupts his overly neat distinction between the 
early humanist Marx and the later scientific Marx. 
"See the second Thesis on Feuerbach, Tucker, ed., 
p. 144 for one clear statement"of criterion for truth. 
See also Tucker, ed., Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844, p. 91 for Marx's treatment of man 
"as an object of natural science." 
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"Martin Seliger, The Marxist Conception of 
Ideology (London, 1977), p. 196. 
""Hitherto, every form of society has been based 
as we have seen on the antagonism of oppressing and op-
pressed classes." Tucker, ed., The Communist Manifes-
to, p. 483. 
1 8"The ideas of the ruling class in every epoch are 
the ruling ideas." Tucker, ed., The German Ideology, 
p. 172. 
""In considering such transformations a distinc-
tion should always be made between the material trans-
formation of the economic conditions of production 
which can be determined with the precision of natural 
science, and the legal, political, religious, aes-
thetic, or philosophic,—in short ideological forms in 
which men become conscious of this conflict and fight 
it out." Tucker, ed.. Introduction to the Critique of 
Political Economy, p. 5. 
""This whole semblance, that the rule of a certain 
class is only the rule of certain ideas, comes to a 
natural end, of course, as soon as class rule in gen-
eral ceases to be the form in which society is organ-
ized, that is to say, as soon as it is no longer neces-
sary to represent a particular interest as general or 
the general interest as ruling." Tucker, ed., The 
German Ideology, p. 174. 
"It must be emphasized that Marxian empiricism is 
a metaphorical, not a literal empiricism. If, for ex-
ample, a historian and a physicist were both to 
"empirically" study the Declaration of Independence, 
their methods would be fundamentally different, and so 
would their observations. When a historian observes 
and analyzes a historical text, is he using the same 
method as a biochemist who observes and analyzes blood? 
To take empiricism literally would lead to philosophi-
cal behaviorism, which would make historical writing 
and knowledge impossible. 
"German Ideology, p. 149. 
"This is a reason why an analytic of ordinary lan-
guage reading of Marx is inadequate. Cohen, p. 30, 
literalizes the base/superstructure metaphor, thus com-
mitting an important category mistake. Cohen's logical 
rigor is won at the expense of an excessively literal-
minded interpretation of Marx. See also E. P. 
Thompson, The Poverty of Theory (New York, 1978), p. 
84. 
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"This approach to Marx follows Melvin Rader, 
Marx 1s Interpretation of History (New York, 1979). See 
especially the introduction. 
"Most Marxists employ both the building and con-
versation metaphors as heuristic devices, but there ex-
ists a considerable degree of disparity in the degree 
to which each is emphasized and endorsed. Circular 
Marxists tend to be uncomfortable with "linear" 
metaphors. For example, Eugene D. Genovese (a circular 
Marxist) has tried to " . . . come to terms with the 
'base-superstructure' problem that has plagued Marxism 
since its inception" by emphasizing that " . . . ideas, 
once called into being and rooted in important social 
groups, have a life of their own." The World the 
Slaveholders Made (New York, 1969), p. vii. 
2 *"Base-Superstructure tends to be the model used 
for the more reductive interpretation." Rader, p. xxi. 
Base can be conceived without superstructure, but not 
vice versa. 
2"This point is made by Lichtheim, p. 20. See also 
Friedrich Engels, Anti-Duhrinq or The Dialectics of 
Nature for examples of his one-sided, ultra-materialist 
Marxism. 
2SPlekhanov and Lenin invented "dialectical materi-
alism," a term which Marx nowhere uses. See Andrew 
Rothstein, trans., G. V. Plekhanov, The Monist View of 
History (New York, 1972), p. 220 and passim. 
"Lenin also generally sided with the determinist, 
reductive Marxists—the "transcript doctrine" of con-
sciousness outlined in Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism is the most striking single example of this. 
Lenin is not consistent, however; the voluntarism of 
What is to be Done? for example does not mesh comforta-
bly with the fatalistic mechanism of his other work. 
2 ,The divergencies of world history from Marx's own 
prognostications forced Lenin to attempt a reinter-
pretation and reexamination. The result was not minor 
repair but wholesale revision; i.e., Imperialism, the 
Final State of Capitalism. 
"Less than half of Marx's work had been published 
prior to 1914. The unpublished manuscripts, which in-
cluded The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844, The German Ideology, are two chief "indetermi-
nist" texts. 
"Istvan Meszaros, in "Contingent and Necessary 
Class Consciousness," p. 87 in Aspects of History and 
Class Consciousness (New York, 1972) elucidates the in-
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terdeterminist conception of causality tersely: "In a 
mechanical conception there is a clear cut line of 
demarcation between 'determined' and 'determinants.* 
Not so within the framework of a dialectical metho-
dology . . . although the economic foundations of capi-
talist society constitute the 'ultimate determinants' 
of the social being of its classes, these 'ultimate 
determinants' are at the same time also 'determined 
determinants'." What novel meaning is to be attached 
to the word "ultimate" in this context? When we under-
stand "ultimate" in this way, does the cause/effect 
distinction still exist? See Seliger, p. 44. 
1 "Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness is 
a neo-Hegelian text. See page 61 for example, where 
class is defined on the basis of consciousness rather 
than with reference to its members' position in the 
economic structure. This is the crux of the argument 
•between E. P. Thompson and G. A. Cohen about the 
criteria for the definition of class. See Cohen, p. 
73-77. 
"Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other 
Writings, trans. Louis Marks (New York, 1957), p. 82 
writes that "the most significant philosophical combi-
nation that occurred was that in which Marxism was 
blended with various idealist tendencies, and was 
regarded by the orthodox, who were necessarily bound to 
the cultural currents of the last century (positivism, 
scientism), as an absurdity." Also associated with the 
introduction of idealist, neo-Hegelian elements into 
Marxism were Korsch and Bernstein. 
"Lukacs, in the 1967 preface to History and Class 
Consciousness, p. xxviii, gets down on all fours in ac-
quiescing to Stalinist criticism of his finest book: 
"these facts meant that I had to rethink my theoretical 
position. In the debates of the Russian Party I agreed 
with Stalin about the necessity for socialism in one 
country and this shows very clearly the start of a new 
epoch in my thought . . . ." 
"Lichtheim, p. 67, hits the nail right on the 
head: " . . . Soviet Marxism is to be understood as a 
monistic system sui generis, rooted in Engels' inter-
pretation of Marx . . . ." 
"As E. P. Thomson notes, " . . . I can no longer 
speak of a single, common Marxist tradition, there are 
two traditions, whose bifurcation and disengagement 
from each other has been slow, and whose final declara-
tion of irreconcilable antagonism was delayed—as an 
historical event--until 1956." Poverty of Theory, pp. 
188-89. Thompson is substantially correct, but, as has 
been demonstrated, a single Marxist tradition (set of 
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concepts) does not exist even within Marx's own 
writings. Insofar as a single Marxist tradition has 
ever existed, its source is in Stalin's practice, not 
Marx's theory. 
"According to Althusser, Marxism is fundamentally 
opposed to moralism, historicism, humanism, and 
empiricism. Not only does Theory invalidate such 
ideological misapprehensions, it also confirms and 
authenticates itself by establishing criteria for con-
firmation and authentication which are self-confirming 
and -authenticating. " . . . theoretical practice is 
indeed its own criterion, and contains in itself defin-
ite protocols with which to validate the quality of its 
product . . . they have no need for verification from 
external practices . . . ,We should say the same for the 
science which concerns us most particularly: histori-
cal materialism." Reading Capital (New York, 1968), p. 
59. Thompson is correct in noting that Althusser, like 
Stalin, is beyond morals, history, or disagreement. 
Perry Anderson, in Arguments Within English Marxism 
(London, 1980), p. 105, attempts to exonerate Althusser 
from the charge of theoretical Stalinism, by referring 
to the historical facts of Althusser's political 
activity. It is worth noting that Anderson's argument 
is based on the "empiricist ideology" which Althusser 
has invalidated (Reading Capital, p. 105). Althusser, 
if he is to be defended, must be defended in terms of 
Theory or not at all. 
"Althusser, Reading Capital, p. 319. 
"Althusser's anti-Hegelian, scientistic reading of 
Marx is reductive, deterministic and dogmatic. He 
reads like Engels without the hi5toricism. Althusser 
also has a lamentable habit of literalizing his 
metaphors. See Thompson, p. 104; Althusser, Reading 
Capital, p. 192. 
"Althusser, Reading Capital, p. 17. It is not 
coincidental that Althusser was originally raised as a 
Catholic. If the God of Aquinas was to be conceived of 
not as a person, but as a "structure," (or a "structure 
of structures") a "whole possessing a type of unity 
quite different from the type of unity of the spiritual 
whole," (Reading Capital, p. 107), then God, not being 
a person, would not have a will; History would then 
have no telos; thus the Logos would be silent. 
Althusserian structuralism is High Scholasticism sanded 
down and varnished with science worship. 
"Ibid., p. 189. It is a pity that the word 
"structure," like the word "effect" and like the word 
"determination," is never defined. 
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"Ibid., p. 186. Is Althusser not ultimately 
asking "What causes Everything?" or "How does 
Everything cause itself?" Althusser pathetically 
echoes Aquinas' search for a Prime Mover within the 
cosmic indifference. A careful reader of Althusser 
eventually gets the half awed, half disappointed feel-
ing of walking among the ruins of a cathedral, as if 
God used to live here bur left some centuries ago. 
"Ibid., p. 310. This baroque elocution comes 
directly from the glossary. 
"Balibar, in Ibid., p. 244. The whole quote is 
"In different structures, the economy is determinant in 
that it determines which of the instances of the social 
structure occupies the determinant place. Not a simple 
relation, but a relation between relations; not a tran-
sitive causality, but rather a structural causality." 
The justification for inventing this complex, not to 
say occult causality, beyond the tautological require-
ments of Althusser's system, is unclear. 
"Ibid., glossary, p. 311. 
"Ibid., pp. 66-67. Moreover "The ideological 
knowledge effect is distinguished by its properties (it 
is an effect of recognition—misrecognition in a mirror 
connexion) from the scientific knowledge effect. But 
insofar as the ideological effect, although it depends 
on other social functions which are dominant in it, 
really possesses its own knowledge effect, it falls 
within the general category" (of the knowledge effect). 
"We are thus liberated from the empiricist 
ideology of history. Ibid., p. 105. 
"'"In short, Althusserianism is Stalinism reduced 
to the paradigm of Theory. It is Stalinism at last, 
theorized as ideology." Thompson, p. 182. Paul 
Anderson, in Arguments Within English Marxism, p. Ill 
lets Althusser off the hook too easily. As late as 
1972, Althusser equated "violent bourgeois anti-
Communism" with "Trotskyist anti-Stalinism." It is 
rather late in the day (1976), some 23 years after 
Stalin's death, that Althusser becomes overtly critical 
of Stalin. 
"Lichtheim, p. 145: "Evilly disposed people have 
been known to hint that Athusser is really after the 
replacement of Stalinism with structuralism . . . It 
has also been suggested that the remedy is worse than 
the disease, since after all Stalinism merely kills the 
body whereas structuralism destroys the mind." 
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"As Seliger notes (p. 197), "ideology purged from 
its pejorative meaning (Theory, the scientific 
knowledge effect) fulfils the function of theodicy. 
Theodicy justifies by God's infinite wisdom that which 
appears in the finite perception of man as the short-
comings of the world. Ideology justifies the undenia-
ble evil in revolutionary methods and the visible im-
perfections of a long established regime or of revolu-
tionary achievements. It does so in reference to the 
wisdom and goodness either inherent in the existing or-
der as a whole or in one yet to materialize fully." 
"In this group are Michael Harrington, E. P. 
Thompson, Bertell Oilman, John Womack, Wolfgang 
Leonhardt, Raymond Williams, Melvin Rader, Eugene D. 
Genovese, Barrington Moore, Jürgen Habermas, Theodore 
Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and others. 
"The central themes of this humanist Marxism (or 
these humanist Marxisms) are alienation (the false con-
sciousness of man in class society) and the ideological 
aspect of class relations. See for example Bertell 
Oilman, Alienation, Marx's Conception of Man in Capi-
talist Society (New York, 1971). 
"This is to be contasted with what Thompson (p. 
169) calls Marx's "Grundrisse Face," the later mecha-
nistic, determinist Marx. 
"See Rader, Marx's Interpretation of History, p. 
xxi, also p. 115. See also Thompson, p. 9. 
"Thompson, p. 47. 
"See Rader, p. 15, and Thompson, Poverty of 
Theory, p. 46, and The Making of the English Working 
Class, pp. 9-10. In defining class in terms of con-
sciousness, Thompson clearly shows a debt to Lukacs, p. 
"Geuss, Raymond, The Idea of a Critical Theory 
(New York, 1981), p. 77. Rader, p. 15, and Thompson, 
Poverty, p. 96-97: "Yes, yes, and perhaps all this is 
so. But how might we put such a concept to work? Is 
law, for example, relatively autonomous, and if so, au-
tonomous of what, and how relatively?" 
"Circular Marxism shows its Hegelian origins in 
denying the Kantian distinction between ethics as a 
practical and politics as a theoretical doctrine of 
right. (Thompson, Poverty, p. 175, p. 358) For 
Hegelians and circular Marxists, there is a theory of 
ethics as well as politics. Geuss, p. 57, notes of 
"ideologiekritik" that "the ought is the ought of 
rationality." As Habermas has said, "I am concerned to 
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question . . . the separation of science and ethics." 
(cited in Lichtheim, p. 209.) This idea is essentially 
Platonic, as is Habermas* "ideal speech situation," 
which is the Platonic dialectic in disguise. For the 
circular Marxists, as opposed to Althusser, history is 
a text in which the Logos does speak. Marcuse, 
discussing Greek rationalism, sums the issue up in One-
Dimensional Man (Boston, 1964), pp. 124-25: "It is the 
essentially human project. If man has learned to see 
and know what he really is, he will act in accordance 
with truth. Epistemology is in itself ethics, and 
ethics is epistemology." The good is knowable, and to 
know the good is to do it. In Platonic terms, the Good 
is True. 
"Thompson, Poverty, p. 290: "But because we know 
the causative context within which an historical event 
arose, it does not follow that the event can therefore 
be explained or evaluated in terms of the cause. 
Attention must be paid to the autonomy of political or 
cultural events, v/hich, none the less, are causally 
conditioned by 'economic* events." This conception of 
causality is too vague for criticism. In the practice 
of Marxist historians, the rejection of mechanism fre-
quently appears to be a rejection of causal necessity. 
But of course the lack of necessity is not to be con-
fused with contingency. Eugene Genovese's treatment of 
the U.S. Civil War in The Political Economy of Slavery 
(New York, 1968), p. 8 is a case in point. Genovese 
rejects determinism, and thus the Civil War is held to 
be probable, not necessary. 
"Meszaros, p. 116: "In an objective dialeccical 
framework of reference, working 'exceptions' constitute 
the general 'rules', which in an unending interchange, 
are made into new 'exceptions' and new 'rules', thus 
both modifying (concretizing) and confirming the gen-
eral conception itself." If this is the case, Marxism 
can predict the outcome of current political events; 
they will manifest a general tendency toward the class-
less condition (the Marxian idea of progress) or they 
will have some other quality or qualities, which can be 
integrated back into theory, which will retroactively 
confirm that theory was not wrong, just incomplete. 
"Exceptions to the 'rules' which Marxian history lays 
down" do not falsify the propositions of which this 
conception of history are composed; these propositions 
are not, in principle, falsifiable. 
"'Oilman, pp. 124-26 engages in an astonishing 
series of intellectual contortions in the course of at-
tempting to salvage a consistent relationship between 
consciousness and its material concomitants. When the 
consciousness of an individual is radically different 
from others whose objective relations to the means of 
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production arc identical, the cause is "personal life": 
"It is a matter of family, friends, and one's very 
place on the earth each moment of the day. This is the 
area of human existence which Marx stakes out, without 
too much precision, as the 'personal life'. On occa-
sion the conditions operating in this area are suffi-
cient to overturn the results that naturally flow from 
one's activity in the mode of production, and the class 
relations based upon it." This appears to mean that a 
man whose consciousness is radically different from 
what is typical of people whose relations to the social 
means of production are identical with his, has a 
"personal life," and thus his consciousness is atypical 
because of his personal life. It might, with equal 
logical justification, be argued that a man whose con-
sciousness is typical for his class also has a personal 
life, and thus his consciousness is typical because of 
his personal life. This new construct, "^personal 
life," thus explains all manifestations of human con-
sciousness, and since "personal life" even explains 
those cases, like Newton, which "class" could not, 
Oilman has implicitly succeeded in showing that the 
concept of class is more or less superfluous now that 
it is meaningful to explain consciousness in terms of 
"personal life." One cannot help but suspect that 
Oilman's consciousness of his unique insight was deter-
mined not by his "personal life" but by the logical 
necessity of explaining away the incomplete correlation 
between consciousness and class. 
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